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BRIEF REPORT
Don’t Sit So Close to Me: Unconsciously Elicited Affect Automatically
Provokes Social Avoidance
Natalie A. Wyer and Guglielmo Calvini
University of Plymouth
Behavior may be automatically prompted by cues in our social environment. Previous research has
focused on cognitive explanations for such effects. Here we hypothesize that affective processes are
susceptible to similar automatic influences. We propose that exposure to groups stereotyped as dangerous
or violent may provoke an anxiety response and, thus, a tendency to move away. In the present
experiment, we subliminally exposed participants to images of such a group, and found that they
displayed greater avoidance in a subsequent interaction. Critically, this effect was explained by their
increased sensitivity to threat-related information. These findings demonstrate an affective mechanism
responsible for nonconscious priming effects on interpersonal behavior.
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Upon encountering an individual who (by virtue of physical
appearance or membership in a negatively stereotyped group) is
associated with hostility or aggression, one’s spontaneous response
is likely to be to move away (e.g., by crossing the street or taking
a seat on the other side of the room). Such responses may be
elicited even in the absence of conscious consideration of the
actual threat posed by the individual. Notably, research into what
have become known as “prime-to-behavior” effects has estab-
lished exactly how little conscious reflection is needed in order for
exposure to a stereotyped out-group to result in significant behav-
ioral changes (see Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001, for a review).
Although there have been numerous demonstrations of how
priming representations of a stereotyped group can influence both
cognitive and behavioral responses, relatively little attention has
been directed at the potential for stereotype priming to give rise to
affective responses. This is somewhat surprising, as, in many
cases, one’s representation of an out-group involves not only what
one knows but also how one feels about the group. Indeed, there
may be many situations in which one’s predominant response is
affective in nature. This may be particularly true when a social
out-group is strongly associated with negative emotions such as
fear or disgust—in such cases, one’s affective response to encoun-
ters with the out-group may be a significant predictor of one’s
behavioral responses to the group. Yet this possibility has so far
been discounted in research on stereotype priming and its auto-
matic effects on behavior.
In large part, this tendency has resulted from findings reported
by Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (1996) indicating that activating
elderly stereotypes produced stereotype-consistent behavior (walk-
ing more slowly) but did not appear to influence participants’
mood. Based on these results, Bargh and colleagues concluded that
affective processes are unlikely to play any role in prime-to-
behavior effects. According to this view, behavior results from the
activation of behavioral representations associated with a primed
group. Thus, exposure to an out-group automatically activates its
mental representation, which includes the group’s prototypical
behaviors. The congruent motor programs are then elicited and the
following behavior automatically conforms to the out-group. How-
ever, with respect to Bargh et al. (1996), it is noteworthy that
behavioral and affective consequences of priming were measured
in separate experiments, making it difficult to draw firm conclu-
sions about the extent to which affect did or did not mediate
behavior. Furthermore, unlike group stereotypes that include dan-
ger or threat, the affective responses triggered by elderly people
may be subtler and may not be strongly associated with a dominant
behavioral reaction.
While we do not refute the possibility that prime-to-behavior
effects may sometimes be the direct and unmediated consequence
of the activation of a group representation alone, recent evidence
suggests that such effects can also be mediated by changes in how
the self, others, or the situation are perceived. For example,
Smeesters, Wheeler, and Kay (2010) propose that “indirect”
prime-to-behavior effects emerge when a prime alters self-
construal, biases perceptions of others, or changes one’s interpre-
tation of the present situational context. In each case, priming
effects on behavior are underpinned by cognitive mechanisms that
produce prime-congruent changes in perception.
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Of greater importance for the present work, research on emotion
activation would suggest that the move to completely disregard the
role of affect may have been premature. Unconsciously elicited
emotions have a direct effect on affect-relevant behavior (Ruys &
Stapel, 2008), and unconscious perception of affectively laden
social stimuli elicits congruent behavioral and affective responses
(Winkielman, Berridge, & Wilbarger, 2005). Therefore, it be-
comes critical to investigate whether such affective reactions also
contribute to automatic effects of stereotypes on behavior. Indeed,
we suggest that one’s behavioral reaction to individuals perceived
as threatening may have more to do with one’s affective or
emotional response than with the thoughts that spring to mind
when one sees such individuals. In previous work by Plant and
Devine (2003), overt anxiety was a significant predictor of avoid-
ance of intergroup contact. Anxiety or feelings of threat that are
induced by nonconscious priming may similarly encourage avoid-
ance. Unlike intergroup anxiety, however, anxiety stemming from
unconscious exposure to a threatening group is likely to produce
avoidance in the absence of a specific (consciously perceived)
target—thus, generalized avoidance behavior (rather than avoid-
ance of a specific group or group member) may emerge.
Here, we tested the hypothesis that priming a social group
stereotyped to be hostile (“hoodies” in the United Kingdom, de-
fined in the Oxford English Dictionary as “a young person who
wears a hoodie and is typically regarded as socially disruptive . . .
a hooligan, a thug”) provokes a state of tension marked by in-
creased sensitivity to signs of danger or threat. We expect that this
affective response will, in turn, produce avoidance in an interper-
sonal context. Specifically, we propose that exposure to the group
“hoodies” will elicit affective responses that are typically associ-
ated with encountering a hoodie (i.e., anxiety or fear), which will
encourage behavior tailored to coping with that affective state (i.e.,
avoiding potential threats).
We subliminally primed participants with images of a young
man who appeared to be a hoodie or who was neutral in appear-
ance. Participants then completed a selective attention task de-
signed to assess their level of anxiety by measuring their sensitiv-
ity to threat-related stimuli. Finally, participants were led to
believe that they would be meeting another participant, and the
distance they placed between themselves and the person they
expected to meet was measured as an indication of avoidance
behavior. Because situations involving unfamiliar others may be
construed as potentially threatening, we hypothesized that partic-
ipants who were primed with images of a hoodie would tend to
avoid unfamiliar others, and their avoidance would be mediated by
sensitivity to threat.
Method
Participants
Participants were 52 undergraduate students at the University of
Plymouth (38 female, Mage  22.15) who completed the study to
fulfill a course requirement.1
Design and Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to a hoodie prime or neu-
tral prime condition. The priming phase was adapted from Bargh
et al. (1996; Study 3). Participants were introduced to a “spatial
perception” study, which was in fact the priming task. The com-
puterized task consisted of 100 trials, each beginning with a row of
asterisks in the center of the screen (1000 ms), followed by the
priming stimulus (11 ms), a series of hash marks covering the same
area as the prime (11 ms), a pattern mask of gray ovals (21 ms),
and a display of colored dots (up to 2000 ms). Participants were
asked to judge whether the number of dots was odd or even and
respond by pressing one of two keys. The prime-mask sequence
varied depending on condition. Participants in the hoodie prime
condition were presented with a grayscale photograph (247  269
pixels on a 640 480 screen) of a young man in a hooded shirt (in
the fashion of a hoodie). Participants in the neutral prime condition
were presented with a grayscale photograph of the same young
man dressed in casual, but nonhooded, attire.
Second, participants completed a digit matching task designed
to assess whether the priming stimuli had elicited a heightened
state of anxiety or threat. Previous studies confirm that chronically
anxious individuals typically show increased interference from
threat-related words in selective attention tasks (e.g., Williams,
Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996; cf. Rothermund, Voss, & Wentura,
2008). Similarly, emotionally salient or personally significant
words capture nonanxious participants’ attention during selective
attention tasks (Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Wolford & Morrison,
1980). Because the hoodie prime was expected to elicit an affec-
tive state of heightened anxiety or threat, the attention of partici-
pants exposed to that prime should be automatically captured by
threat-related words in a selective attention task. The digit match-
ing task was modeled on a digit parity task, which has shown
increased processing interference from threat-related words com-
pared to neutral words (Aquino & Arnell, 2007).
Half of the 48 trials consisted of threat-related words (e.g.,
agony, coffin, disease; MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986) and half
of neutral words (e.g., potato, umbrella, locker). Each word was
presented in the center of the screen, flanked on both sides by a
number. On half of the trials, the numbers were the same (e.g., a
“7” appeared on each side of the word), whereas, on the other half,
the numbers differed (e.g., a “7” appeared on the left, and a “5”
appeared on the right). Words and numbers were both presented in
Arial 14-point font. Participants’ task was to judge whether the two
numbers were the same and respond by pressing one of two keys.
The time required to respond to each trial was recorded. To the
extent that participants’ attention was drawn to threatening infor-
mation, they should be slower to make the digit matching judg-
ment on trials involving threat-related words because of the in-
crease in attentional processing elicited by those words.
After the digit matching task, participants were informed that
the next part of the experiment required them to work on a task
with another participant in an adjacent room. The experimenter led
the participant into a room (approximately 20 m2) where a table
was placed in the corner opposite from the door. One chair was
placed at the far end of the table, upon which was a (nonhooded)
jacket and backpack (neutral with respect to gender), with a stack
of similar chairs placed near the door. The experimenter informed
1 Participant gender did not moderate affective or behavioral responses
to the prime, as no significant main or interaction effects involving gender
were found.
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the participant that the other student had left to make a phone call
but would return momentarily. The experimenter explained that
while s/he was waiting, the participant could begin by filling out a
questionnaire, and so s/he should take another chair from the stack
and have a seat at the table while the experimenter retrieved the
questionnaire. After the participant was seated, the experimenter
returned with a questionnaire (unrelated to the current experiment)
and, on the pretext of explaining what to do, knelt down to place
a marker on the floor at the corner of the participant’s chair. The
distance between this marker and the chair purportedly belonging
to the other participant was measured and recorded at the end of
the experiment.
After completing the questionnaire, participants were thor-
oughly debriefed and excused. An extensive funnel debriefing
procedure (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) was used to confirm that
participants were unaware of the priming stimuli. No participant
reported awareness either of the priming stimuli or of any connec-
tion among the three phases of the experiment.
Results
Seating Distance
An independent-samples t-test comparing participants’ seating
distance revealed that those in the hoodie prime condition sat
significantly farther away (M  147.38 cm, SD  75.24) than did
those in the neutral prime condition (M  106.81 cm, SD 
42.49), t(50)  2.39, p  .02, d  .68.2 Avoidance is a response
typical of individuals who encounter hoodies (see Discussion).
Here, avoidance emerged among participants for whom images of
hoodies were primed, as a response to someone who was not
themselves believed to be a hoodie.
Attention to Threat
Participants’ response times (RTs) on the digit matching task
were examined to determine whether participants’ attention
was automatically drawn to threat-related stimuli. After removing
trials where response times deviated more than 3 standard devia-
tions from the mean (1.2% of all responses), average RTs on trials
involving threat-related versus neutral words were computed sep-
arately and subjected to a two-way mixed-model Analysis of
Variance (ANOVA), where trial type (threat-related vs. neutral)
was entered as a repeated-measures variable and prime (hoodie vs.
neutral) was a between-participants variable. This analysis yielded
only a significant two-way interaction, F(1, 50)  4.51, p  .04,
p
2  .08 (see Figure 1). Analyses of simple main effects revealed
that hoodie-primed participants were slower than neutral-primed
participants on trials involving threat-related words, F(1, 50) 
3.05, p  .08, d  0.48, whereas there was no difference between
the two groups on neutral trials, F  1, d  0.20. Furthermore,
hoodie-primed participants were slower to respond to threat-
related than neutral trials, t(25)  1.93, p  .065, d  0.40,
whereas neutral-primed participants were not, t(25)  1.12, p 
.27, d  0.23. Thus, exposure to hoodies produced a heightened
sensitivity to threat-related stimuli.
Mediation
Threat-sensitivity scores were computed for each participant as
the average RT to threat-related trials minus the average RT to
neutral trials on the attention task. These scores represent the
additional attention captured by threat-related words, with higher
scores indicating greater attentional bias toward threat-related in-
formation. To assess whether differences in threat sensitivity
scores accounted for the effects of hoodie priming on seating
distance, the steps outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986) were
followed (see Figure 2). As formal tests of mediation (e.g., Sobel)
are not appropriate for small samples, the procedure recommended
by Preacher and Hayes (2004) was followed. The bootstrap esti-
mate of the indirect effect was 16.11 (SE  10.69), with a 95%
confidence interval ranging from 1.27 to 46.93. This suggests that
threat sensitivity did, in fact, mediate the effect of hoodie priming
on seating distance.
However, consistent with our hypotheses, additional analyses
indicated that the mediation was driven by hoodie-primed partic-
ipants, for whom threat sensitivity was a significant predictor of
seating distance, b  .69, t(25)  4.65, p  .001. Among neutral-
primed participants, the relationship between threat sensitivity and
seating distance was nonsignificant, b  .09, t(25)  .46, p  .65.
Formal tests (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007, moderated medi-
ation Model 1) confirmed a significant conditional indirect effect,
b  .31, t(51)  3.60, p  .001.
Discussion
The present experiment establishes, for the first time, that sub-
liminal exposure to a threatening out-group produces not only
cognitive and behavioral responses but also affective responses.
Moreover, the data reported here establish that such affective
responses determine prime-to-behavior effects under conditions in
which the primed out-group is associated with strong affective
reactions and in which the behavior in question is assessed in
interpersonal contexts. It appears that unconsciously perceiving the
2 The effect of hoodie priming on seating distance appears to be highly
reliable, as it has been replicated in three additional experiments not
reported here.
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Figure 1. Mean response time (with standard errors) on digit matching
task, as a function of word type (threat-related vs. neutral) and prime
condition (hoodie vs. neutral).
3AUTOMATIC AFFECT AND AVOIDANCE
presence of a social group produces an automatic affective re-
sponse that alone influences subsequent social behavior.3
This research highlights the complexity of priming effects on
behavior. Only recently have researchers begun to identify the
conditions in which distinct varieties of prime-to-behavior effects
occur (e.g., DeMarree & Loersch, 2009) and to explore the mech-
anisms responsible for producing them (e.g., Smeesters, Wheeler,
& Kay, 2009). The overwhelming majority of this work has
focused on cognitive factors that play an undeniable role in pro-
ducing these effects. However, this singular focus has neglected
the possibility that affective mechanisms may also be at work. The
present research provides a first demonstration that priming drives
attention to affectively relevant information, which, in turn, pre-
dicts the behavioral outcome.
Much of the previous work has focused on behavioral measures
that can be interpreted in terms of multiple processes (e.g., assim-
ilation, contrast, or response), making their implications ambigu-
ous (e.g., Chen & Bargh, 1997). In contrast, the results reported
here are unequivocal in their implication: increased seating dis-
tance reflects a response (rather than assimilation or contrast) to
hoodies. Unlike early reports of prime-to-behavior effects, which
described behavioral assimilation or contrast to activated traits or
stereotypes (e.g., Dijksterhuis, et al., 1998), response effects entail
behavior that is suited to interacting with a member of a primed
social group (e.g., Cesario, Plaks, & Higgins, 2006; Jonas &
Sassenberg, 2006). We were careful in this study to identify a
behavior that is unambiguously a response to hoodies and not a
stereotypic association. In pretesting reported in Wyer, Calvini,
Nash, and Miles (2010), avoidance was the most frequently listed
response to encountering a “hoodie” but had no association with
the hoodie stereotype. The same pretesting indicated that
approach-related behavior (e.g., crowding, pushing, etc.) was un-
related to the hoodie stereotype. Thus, we are able to conclude that
our measure of seating distance reflects a behavioral response to
hoodies rather than either assimilation or contrast. This strongly
suggests that our results are the outcome of an affective process
rather than stereotype activation.
Response effects of priming have previously been attributed to
direct activation of interaction behaviors via goal states (Cesario et
al., 2006), situation models (Jonas & Sassenberg, 2006), or, most
recently, action semantics (Cesario, Plaks, Hagiwara, Navarrete, &
Higgins, 2010). In particular, Cesario et al. (2010) reported that
participants primed with African American faces later increased
their physical distance from another (unknown) person, if they
were able to do so. Intriguingly, participants in the same study
displayed a different behavioral response (i.e., aggression) if their
ability to distance themselves was constrained by the physical
environment. While the authors attributed these effects to activa-
tion of fight-or-flight action semantics, their results are largely
compatible with the conceptualization offered here. Threat-related
affect is likely to trigger a “flight” response when social avoidance
is possible; when it is not possible, other behavioral strategies are
likely to be used.
The present work highlights a second, albeit related, route for
prime-to-behavior effects. Our findings suggest that exposure to
the feared group, “hoodies,” produced increased sensitivity to
threat, which then led to greater avoidance behavior. Thus, the
unconscious activation of an anxious response associated with a
social group (such as the feeling experienced after exposure to a
hoodie) may automatically trigger behaviors suitable to resolve the
unconscious affect. In fact, social avoidance is likely to be the first
and most direct response to cope with unpredictable conditions in
the absence of further appraisal processes (see Kurzban & Leary,
2001).
Alternatively, an unconscious affective response might also
influence people’s social behavior in a less direct way by mediat-
ing their conscious appraisal of the behavior’s social context. In
the current experiment, participants may have construed their
interaction partner as the actual source of their affective state,
hence intentionally avoiding interaction with a threatening indi-
vidual. This is not incompatible with Smeesters et al.’s (2009)
findings that trait priming influences interpersonal behavior by
influencing how one’s interaction partner is construed. Such con-
strual processes may have contributed to participants’ avoidance
behavior in the present experiment.
In this study, however, the construal appears likely to have been
driven by affective processes rather than by straightforward (cog-
nitive) assimilation of the other person to the prime. The relative
contribution of affective and cognitive mechanisms in producing
response effects will need to be clarified by further investigation.
It is likely that some groups are more strongly associated with
stereotypic beliefs while others have predominantly affective as-
sociations; thus, the extent to which affective processes play a role
in producing prime-to-behavior effects may vary. We would con-
tend, however, that the great majority of groups that one may
encounter in daily life are characterized by both strong affective
and cognitive associations. Thus, the unconscious influence of
priming on (social) behavior will be the outcome of the interaction
of both types of automatic responses to the prime.
In closing, the present experiment advances the current literature
by demonstrating, for the first time, that affective processes con-
tribute to prime-to-behavior effects. Of course, it is yet to be
determined how the activation of affective responses may interact
3 Readers may question whether exposure to threatening words in the
attention task may have amplified the prime-induced affect, only thus
determining the avoidance behavior of hoodie-primed participants (who
processed them more extensively). This would imply that the link between
affect and behavior is unlikely to emerge outside of limited experimental
conditions. We discount this possibility on the basis of similar work (Wyer
et al., 2010) in which no threatening words were presented (nor did any
other intervening task occur between hoodie priming and the seating
measure), and yet an even larger effect on seating distance was observed
(d  1.12 vs. 0.68 in the current study).
Prime 
(Neutral = 0; Hoodie = 1) 
 
Threat Sensivity 
 
Seang Distance 
β = .29* 
(β = .49***)
β = .43** 
(β = .32*)
β = .20 
Figure 2. Threat sensitivity as a mediator of the effect of hoodie priming
on seating distance. Betas in parentheses indicate simple or direct effects
on seating distance; betas outside of parentheses indicate effects on seating
distance when the other variable in the model is controlled for.  p  .05.
 p  .01.  p  .001.
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with other prime-congruent cognitive representations (such as
group stereotypes). The present findings suggest that, at least for
highly affectively charged social groups, interpersonal behavior is
unambiguously the consequence of the individual’s affective states
alone. However, the automatic activation of the group’s cognitive
representation (i.e., stereotype) may still occur and play a role in
other behavioral conditions. Thus, this study should serve as an
impetus for further research into affective routes through which
prime-to-behavior effects may emerge.
References
Anderson, A. K., & Phelps, E. A. (2001). Lesions of the human amygdala
impair enhanced perception of emotionally salient events. Nature, 411,
305–309.
Aquino, J. M., & Arnell, K. M. (2007). Attention and the processing of
emotional words: Dissociating effects of arousal. Psychonomic Bulletin
& Review, 14, 430–435.
Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (2000). The mind in the middle: A
practical guide to priming and automaticity research. In H. T. Reis &
C. M. Judd (Eds.), Handbook of research methods in social and per-
sonality psychology (pp. 253–285). New York, NY: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Bargh, J. A., Chen, M., & Burrows, L. (1996). Automaticity of social
behavior: Direct effects of trait construct and stereotype activation on
action. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 230–244.
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable
distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic and
statistical considerations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
51, 1173–1182.
Cesario, J., Plaks, J. E., Hagiwara, N., Navarrete, C. D., & Higgins, E. T.
(2010). The ecology of automaticity: How situational contingencies
shape action semantics and social behavior. Psychological Science, 21,
1311–1317.
Cesario, J., Plaks, J. E., & Higgins, E. T. (2006). Automatic social behavior
as motivated preparation to interact. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 90, 893–910.
Chen, M., & Bargh, J. A. (1997). Nonconscious behavioral confirmation
processes: The self-fulfilling nature of automatically-activated stereo-
types. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 541–560.
DeMarree, K. G., & Loersch, C. (2009). Who am I and who are you?
Priming and the influence of self versus other focused attention. Journal
of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 440–443.
Dijksterhuis, A., & Bargh, J. A. (2001). The perception-behavior express-
way: Automatic effects of social perception on social behavior. In M. P.
Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 33, pp.
1–40). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Dijksterhuis, A., van Knippenberg, A., Spears, R., Postmes, T., Stapel,
D. A., Koomen, W., & Scheepers, D. (1998). Seeing one thing and doing
another: Contrast effects in automatic behavior. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 75, 862–871.
Jonas, K. J., & Sassenberg, K. (2006). Knowing how to react: Automatic
response priming from social categories. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 90, 709–721.
Kurzban, R., & Leary, M. R. (2001). Evolutionary origins of stigmatiza-
tion: The functions of social exclusion. Psychological Bulletin, 127,
187–208.
MacLeod, C., Mathews, A., & Tata, P. (1986). Attentional bias in emo-
tional disorders. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 95, 15–20.
Plant, E. A., & Devine, P. G. (2003). The antecedents and consequences of
interracial anxiety. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29,
1–12.
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2004). SPSS and SAS procedures for
estimating indirect effects in simple mediation models. Behavior Re-
search Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 36, 717–731.
Preacher, K. J., Rucker, D. D., & Hayes, A. F. (2007). Addressing mod-
erated mediation hypotheses: Theory, methods, and prescriptions. Mul-
tivariate Behavioral Research, 42, 185–227.
Rothermund, K., Voss, A., & Wentura, D. (2008). Counter-regulation in
affective attentional biases: A basic mechanism that warrants flexibility
in emotion and motivation. Emotion, 8, 34–46.
Ruys, K. I., & Stapel, D. A. (2008). The secret life of emotions. Psycho-
logical Science, 19, 385–391.
Smeesters, D. H. R. V., Wheeler, S. C., & Kay, A. C. (2009). The role of
interpersonal perceptions in the prime-to-behavior pathway. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 96, 395–414.
Smeesters, D. H. R. V., Wheeler, S. C., & Kay, A. C. (2010). Indirect
prime-to-behavior effects: The role of perceptions of the self, others, and
situations in connecting primed constructs to social behavior. Advances
in Experimental Social Psychology, 42, 259–317.
Williams, J. M. G., Mathews, A., & MacLeod, C. (1996). The emotional
Stroop task and psychopathology. Psychological Bulletin, 120, 3–24.
Winkielman, P., Berridge, K. C., & Wilbarger, J. L. (2005). Unconscious
affective reactions to masked happy versus angry faces influence con-
sumption behavior and judgments of value. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 31, 121–135.
Wolford, G., & Morrison, F. (1980). Processing of unattended visual
information. Memory & Cognition, 8, 521–527.
Wyer, N. A., Calvini, G., Nash, A., & Miles, N., (2010). Priming in
interpersonal contexts: Consequences for affect and behavior. Person-
ality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36, 1693–1705.
Received June 22, 2010
Revision received March 21, 2011
Accepted March 28, 2011 
5AUTOMATIC AFFECT AND AVOIDANCE
